burg's essay on sex discrimination 3 takes the latter course. Consisting largely of a summary of the Burger Court's decisions, the essay properly characterizes the Court's performance as "striking" 4 and "spectacular." 5 Because " [e] vening up the rights, responsibilities, and opportunities of men and women was not on the agenda of the Warren Court," ' anything the Burger Court did would improve on the Warren Court's performance. That remains true even though the Burger Court has not done all that supporters of equal rights desired. Without deprecating the accomplishment, though, I want to mention something that I discuss in more detail later: the Burger Court's decisions in gender discrimination cases are shot through with class concerns. 1 Perhaps because of how the essays divide up the terrain, class issues never fully emerge from the background.
The other strategy for sustaining the book's thesis is pursued most clearly by Yale Kamisar in an essay on criminal procedure.' He begins by describing what the Warren Court did. It approved the use of the intrusive investigative techniques often thought necessary in cases of corruption and large-scale trafficking in drugs: undercover agents and electronic surveillance.' It sought to impose the rules professionals in the field had been using without difficulty-warnings and controlled use of investigative stops-on all police departments." l Although Kamisar does not say so, what the Warren Court did was to attempt to remold all police forces on the model of the most thoroughly professionalized. If police departments actually conformed to the professional model, their own adherence to professional norms, more than external controls imposed by the courts, would guarantee the liberty of the citizenry.
Kamisar identifies "two Burger Courts." ' 1 1 The first appeared in the immediate aftermath of the Rehnquist and Powell appointments. That Burger Court seemed to be bent on "gutt[ing]" 12 many of the Warren Court's decisions. Here too Kamisar ventures no explanations, but it seems likely that this first Burger Court felt it essential to establish a different tone from its predecessor, to signal that the forces of law and order had (re)gained control of the Court. Then, that signal clearly sent, the second Burger Court proceeded to consolidate and even extend the most enduring contributions of the Warren Court. It has demonstrated a "strong commitment to the warrant clause"" 3 by insisting that a valid warrant to search a bar and the bartender did not authorize a search of the bar's customers 14 and by holding that the police could not routinely enter a home to make an arrest without a warrant.' 5 It has developed a definition of "interrogation" that is sensitive to the values served by the Miranda warnings 6 and has disinterred the doctrine limiting interrogations after adversary proceedings have been initiated. 17 Kamisar rejects the claim that the decisions of the second Burger Court look tolerable only because they have not fulfilled the worst fears engendered by the decisions of the first Burger Court. 8 I am inclined to agree, but do have some questions about Kamisar's analysis. First, the second Burger Court appears to have come into its own around 1979. With Justice O'Connor replacing Justice Stewart, who had a perverse attraction to the warrant clause,' 9 we may find yet a third Burger Court in the making, one that resembles the first. Second, in describing the Burger Court's first amendment decisions, Thomas Emerson concludes that it "has lost that feeling for the dynamics of the system . . . which was the hallmark of the Warren Court."" 0 Something similar may characterize the criminal procedure decisions. The Warren Court had a vision of policing as an integrated system all elements of which could be professionalized. 2 ' The signals the Warren Court sent to police officers and administrators about its expectations may have been even more significant than its doctrinal innovations. In this light the counterrevolution may have been completed by the first Burger Court. It told police administrators and officers that they could loosen up. The second Burger Court, on this interpretation, simply issues occasional reminders that loosening up does not mean abandoning all controls. The system of policing would be measurably less protective of the citizenry under these circumstances, again no matter what the particular holdings were. My guess is that changes in policing essentially unrelated to judicial doctrine have imposed the kinds of constraints on police forces that the Warren Court sought. These constraints are not, of course, uniform throughout the country nor are they sufficient as yet, but police forces have become more professionalized, and the increasing racial integration of urban police forces has reduced the kind of harassment to which judicial doctrine rarely speaks. 2 2 If my guess is correct, the counterrevolution, if any there was, came too late.
II. WHY THE COUNTERREVOLUTION DID NOT HAPPEN
Certainly it is true that the Burger Court has not (yet) fulfilled the worst fears of those who admire the Warren Court. Yet we know from what they say in their separate opinions that, as individuals, three to five members of the Court have quite conservative political views that sometimes affect their judicial performance. The Warren Court's admirers thought that in every case one or two others would be moved to join the conservatives, producing a uniformly conservative body of law. Why didn't that happen? Anthony Lewis's foreword offers the conventional view that we have come to expect of him. Sure, he says, the judges are political conservatives. But conservatives "are naturally committed to the doctrine of stare decisis . . . [and it] follows logically that they should respect a precedent once established, even though they opposed that result during the process of decision."" 8 Although I have my doubts, perhaps this is so for "true [conservatives such] as Justice John Marshall Harlan." ' 2 4
But, apart from the lack of a counterrevolution, there really is not a lot of evidence that Chief Justice Burger or Justice Rehnquist is a "true" conservative. They are reactionaries, pure and simple, and, as I will argue, they have indeed conducted a counterrevolution of sorts by infusing the forms of adjudication developed by the Warren Court with a new content. 25 Martin Shapiro's. brilliant essay" comes closer to the mark. He net benefits might be wrong.) As a result, no one is really cheering for the Court, but it maintains a solid political base. Although Shapiro does not make the argument in this way, his analysis suggests that "rootless activism" is a political strategy well adapted to preserving the Court's prerogatives in an era when any "rooted" activism-revolutionary or counterrevolutionary-would generate intense opposition. Indeed, the argument can be extended a bit more, as my earlier parenthetical comment hinted. A really clever counterrevolutionary, faced with the political situation Shapiro describes, would conduct what Antonio Gramsci called a war of position. Conceding small gains to the opposition in areas not of central concern, the counterrevolutionary would attempt to secure somewhat larger gains in areas closer to the center and would conduct lighting raids to capture really important targets. 8 There is, however, another reason for the failure of open counterrevolution. Vincent Blasi offers a capsule description of the present Court. 4 He finds the center "intelligent, open-minded, and dedicated," and writes that "[a]n advocate faced with the challenge of changing judicial minds with sound arguments would do better to attempt the task in front of [Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens] than almost any other [group of Justices] that has in the past held the balance of power on the Court.""' Perhaps so, but notice that the task is one of changing minds by argument rather than supplying arguments to support predispositions. Tony Amsterdam must do the former; Rex Lee need only do the latter. I take it to be clear which position an advocate would prefer to be in. If the center is strong, Blasi says, the extremes are weak. Justice Brennan is "pragmatic . . . , more clever than profound." ' 42 Justice Rehnquist is "more a debater than a thinker, more a lawyer than a statesman. 4 3 Blasi says that Brennan and Rehnquist "could serve much better as coalition builders operating at the S" That this analysis makes William Rehnquist sound like Ho Chi Minh is not the only reason I find it attractive.
89 458 U.S. 419 (1982) . 40 Blasi, supra note 32. 41 Id. at 210-11. 41 Id. at 211. I have to say that I do not really grasp the grounds for the deprecatory tone of the contrast. It strikes me as more clever than profound.
4' Id.; see also supra note 42.
center of the Court's divisions," a role that Brennan played for the Warren Court and that Rehnquist could play in the future. 4 ' What is striking about this is not the perfectly accurate observation that Brennan was a coalition builder," 5 nor the depressing suggestion that Rehnquist could become one, 4 ' but the failure to notice that Brennan continues to be a coalition builder. I suspect that when the history of the Supreme Court in the 1970's is written, it will reveal that Brennan's skills contributed as much as anything to the absence of a counterrevolution. For example, one can infer from Justice Brennan's opinions in criminal procedure cases that he simply makes no effort to build a five-person majority in most such cases and that he hoards his resources to deploy them in the cases, criminal procedure or otherwise, that he regards as truly important."
But one need not rely on an extended chain of inference from a pattern of decisions. One need only read Plyler v. Doe. 48 In traditional lawyers' terms, Justice Brennan's opinion, holding unconstitutional a Texas statute that denied a free public education to children of aliens unlawfully in this country, is analytically indefensible. 4 It jams together doctrines that other cases carefully held apart 50 and refrains in a footnote from deciding an issue that plays a crucial role in a later section of the opinion. 51 Powell is committed. So I guess I ought to stick in some language expressly reaffirming our adherence to the Rodriquez approach. 59 Justice Marshall's not going to like that,"' but he certainly will go no farther than writing a concurring opinion.
Who's left? Justice Stevens has this bizarre attraction to the idea that equal protection cases involving state regulations affecting aliens are rather like preemption cases. 6 " No one else will go along with a pure preemption analysis, probably correctly, but I can stress the primary responsibility of the national government for regulating aliens and for creating the problem Texas was dealing with in the first place. Having done that, I can try a sort of reverse preemption argument, that the statute is unconstitutional kind of because Congress didn't authorize it. 62 That's five. What a weird opinion this is going to turn out to be.
And so it is. 63 Precedents, politics, and personality thus have influenced the Burger Court's failed counterrevolution. But something surely has happened.
III. WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED
The Burger Court differs from the Warren Court along dimensions that I label technical, cultural, and political. Although some of the differences are only matters of degree, taken together they have significant consequences.
Along the technical dimension, the most striking difference is the one to which Thomas Emerson alludes in referring to the Burger Court's insensitivity to the systemic operations of institutions regulated by law. 4 Emerson specifically mentions the Burger Court's "return[] to a balancing test" in first amendment cases. 65 There is no necessary connection between relying on balancing and making relatively conservative decisions, nor between adopting bright-line rules and making relatively liberal ones. It is not hard to imagine a speedy trial rule that barred relief to anyone who had failed to make a timely demand or that started the speedy trial clock running at the moment a demand was made. 6 The grimness of that alternative undoubtedly explains why the Court's decision in Barker v. Wingo 6 0 7 was unanimous in adopting a balancing test in which the demand and its timing were relevant but never dispositive factors. 6 That the stated doctrine requires balancing disposes of no cases, nor does such a doctrine necessarily incline the Court one way or the other. But the choice between balancing and bright-line rules may well affect how actors outside the courts-police officers, or government officials annoyed by the press-approach their tasks. In the absence of a bright-line rule, those actors may be more inclined to test the ill-defined limits of their authority. They may hope that no litigation will result because of the ambiguity of the rule 6 9 or that years later some court will decide that on balance they were right. In this light Kamisar's distinction between the two Burger Courts" 0 takes on a new importance. The first Burger Court, it might be said, accomplished its task by shifting from bright-line rules to balancing tests. That sent the message to police officers. Of course, sometimes the listeners are more aggressive than the broadcasters expected, which Kamisar suggests is the explanation for some of the decisions by the second Burger Court. 7 [Vol. 132:1257 courts into account, the systemic impact of the shift may be more significant than one might think after reading the Court's opinions.
The cultural dimension of the Burger Court's shift from the Warren Court is explored in a superb essay by Robert Burt on the Burger Court and the family. 2 By carefully exposing the often unstated assumptions that animate decisions, Burt establishes that the Burger Court prefers the assertion of communal authority, either through traditional authoritarian families or by social agencies if the parents are too spineless, over the autonomous decisions of families considered as independent social units. 3 The most dramatic pair of cases here is Ingraham v. Wright, 4 which denied parents a say in the administration of corporal punishment to their children in schools, and Parham v. J.R., 5 which allowed parents to commit their unruly children to state mental institutions without anyone (else) to speak for the children. Burt contrasts this vision with the Warren Court's image of reason rather than authority as what defines why and how the state may regulate families. 6 Burt is not happy with either vision, 7 7 but that is less important here than the connection between this analysis and Shapiro's. The Burger Court's family law cases show it defining its constituency as adherents of traditional values, in contrast to the Warren* Court's constituency of highly educated professionals. The shift illustrates one of the cultural changes to which Shapiro's essay directs our attention.
On the borderland between culture and politics lies the Burger Court's enthusiasm for the imperial presidency. Here we are likely to be misled by the cases directly connected to Watergate, 79 in which the Court implicitly acknowledged that, at least with regard to Watergate, Richard Nixon was indeed a crook. 8 
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gate waned and the Court faced a case not involving Watergate itself, it was willing to insulate the President from liability in damages for violating the Constitution." 1 That decision fits into a general pattern of enhancing the power of the President. 2 Moreover, the Court held unconstitutional an effort by Congress to establish an administrative agency, the Federal Election Commission, over which it thought, sensibly enough, it ought to have more control than usual. 8 3 In cases involving prosecutions of legislators, it has endorsed a relatively limited definition of the immunity provided by the speech and debate clause, 4 thus making it easier for prosecutors appointed by the President to influence the composition of Congress. invalidation of legislation only where the political process is unlikely to take account of affected interests 9 demonstrates that there are no political obstacles justifying the Court's action in overturning deals that Presidents had cut with Congress. 9 6 Chief Justice Burger's opinion hews to the interpretivist line and clinches its argument by underlining the word "and."" 1 But Chadha accomplished two things. First, the response to the decision anticipated the "no counterrevolution" thesis. It went roughly like this: "People were afraid that the Burger Court lacked dedication to constitutional principles. The legislative veto case shows that they were wrong. Admittedly, we're not sure why the legislative veto is unconstitutional even after reading the opinions, but by God it does show that they care about 'The Constitution.'" And second, the decision endorsed a theory of the presidency that stresses the prerogatives and powers of the office. 92 Thus the Court satisfied two constituencies: those favoring an imperial President and those espousing a "strict construction" perspective. The final, purely political dimension of what has happened substantially qualifies Vincent Blasi's argument that the Burger Court is characterized by a rootless activism. To Blasi, the Burger Court has been driven to that position by "the reactive nature of judicial review." 9 3 It has been committed to respect for precedent and the cases it confronts have been shaped by lower courts not as deeply conservative as it is. 94 Further, the "rampant growth of government bureaucracy" engendered a sense among the citizenry that the government was too complex and impersonal. 95 It was natural for the Court to respond to this concern by adopting simple constitutional solutions."' Finally, as single issue politics came to distort the legislative process, the Court responded, offering itself as an institution that could take an appropriately comprehensive view of the problems. 9 " According to Blasi, the result has been a Court whose "activism has been inspired not by a commitment to fundamental constitutional principles or noble political " See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT 101-04 (1980 02 This is not to say that the decision enhances the President's power. As Choper shows, Congress has many resources of its own. See J. CHOPER, supra note 90, at 281-311. Chadha forces the deals between the executive and legislative branches to be renegotiated from scratch, but it is not clear that the substantive outcomes of the negotiations will change.
" Blasi, supra note 32, at 208. 94 Id. at 208-09. 95 Id. at 209.
" Id. 9 Id. at 210.
ideals, but rather by the belief that modest injections of logic and compassion by disinterested, sensible judges can serve as a counterforce to some of the excesses and irrationalities of contemporary governmental decision-making." ' 9 8 The Burger Court's activism is "centrist. .. [and] essentially pragmatic in nature, lacking a central theme or an agenda." 9 9
There is less here than it first seems, and the essay by Norman Dorsen and Joel Gora' 0 0 identifies what is missing. Dorsen and Gora examine the Burger Court's free speech decisions and conclude that a "new variable"-property-has been added to the mix of values pro- With this insight it is indeed possible to find the roots of the Burger Court's activism. They lie in the philosophy that the government as a whole has the duty to protect the prerogatives of property' 5 and that no part of the government has the duty to minimize the harms that lack of property inflicts on those so unfortunate as not to have enough. Robert Bennett's essay on poverty law' 0 6 not surprisingly presents the most unrelievedly dark view of the Burger Court. The best he can do to lighten the gloom is to include Califano v. Westcott,"' 0 in which the Court held unconstitutional a federal law extending public assistance to intact families when the father was unemployed but not when the mother was.' 05 Califano v. Westcott is, however, more a gender case than a poverty case.
But the poverty cases are not examples of the Burger Court's activism anyway. More revealing are the free speech cases, 0 9 Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus," n and the like that underscore the Court's preoccupation with protecting property values. I believe that the Court's sympathy to claims of presidential authority'-are cut from the same pattern, in that such authority is seen as essential to guarantee the position of the United States in the world economic and political system, a system that on the whole functions to protect the position of the privileged.
The gender discrimination cases are obviously more problematic. But two points seem worth making. First, many of the relevant decisions hold unconstitutional the exclusion of males from benefits made available to women."U 2 As Ginsburg explains, these decisions can readily be rationalized as attacks on stereotypes of the proper female role."" Those stereotypes are closely bound up with images of household work as unproductive in contrast to "productive" work "outside" the household. They are therefore closely bound up with issues of class as well." 4 The Court's willingness to question gender-role stereotypes will have a limited impact so long as it fails to question class stereotypes too. Yet that is precisely the limit of its activism. Second, because of the present contours of political power in the United States, middleclass women have been the primary direct beneficiaries of the women's movement. That is not to say that working-class women have not benefited, nor is it to assert that women's activists have been satisfied with advances limited in that class-based way. But that fact of political life makes it easier to understand why the Burger Court's activitism in gender cases is at least not inconsistent with its concern for the prerogatives It0 438 U.S. 234 (1978) (contracts clause of the Constitution prohibits states from substantially impairing a contractual relationship, such as the pension provisions of an employment contract, absent a purpose of resolving a broad, generalized economic or social problem).
"I" See supra note 82; see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 112 See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (Alabama's statutory scheme imposing alimony obligations on husbands but not on wives violates the equal protection clause). Where the benefits are an essential part of the income that flows to a family unit over the lifetime of its members, as are Social Security benefits, one cannot unambiguously define the gender bearing the burden. For example, in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), the Court held unconstitutional a statute that provided a benefit to female caretakers of a deceased wage earner's child but none to male caretakers. From one view, this decision increased the income of fathers after their wives died. From another, it increased the value of the fringe benefits included in wives' incomes during their lifetimes.
113 Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 137-40. 114 The "inside/outside the home" dichotomy rests on the image of a world of work, governed by class relations, contrasted to a world of domesticity, governed by gender relations. of property. And, of course, in its most direct confrontation with a problem in which women's issues and class issues intersected, the Court in Harris v. McRae' 15 forthrightly held that governments had no duty to make abortions available to those who could not otherwise afford them.
CONCLUSION
The Burger Court's interest in the prerogatives of property suggests that its activism is more rooted than Blasi indicates. But does that impair the "no counterrevolution" thesis? According to Blasi's assessment of the Warren Court, it does. He writes, "[T]he Warren Court was fired by a vision of the equal dignity of man," and though "on many occasions" it "exhibited a pragmatic, compromising side," the compromises "took place against a background in which the direction of constitutional development was both clear and, to many, inspiring." 6 The Burger Court is also pragmatic, but it has "no deep-seated vision. 1 n 7 Contrary to Blasi, I believe that it does have a vision, one that, moreover, is also inspiring "to many." But notice the difference between Blasi's and Kamisar's contrasts between the Warren and Burger Courts. I believe that Kamisar is more accurate. Here I revert to Shapiro's argument that the Warren Court constitutionalized the policies of the New Deal. I have no doubt that the New Deal program was, for its time and given the limits on effective transformative action in the United States, a major achievement, providing an important foundation-or "safety net"-which has recently been undermined (or unravelled). But that program was no less pragmatic and compromising than any other political program. It is no more a moral vision when adopted by the Supreme Court than it was when Congress adopted it. Or, to put it another way, what Blasi views as occasional compromises with a moral vision should rather be seen as integral parts that serve to define precisely what that vision was.
Indeed it may be that the ultimate judgment on the Warren Court is that "many" were able to read into its decisions a moral vision that was not there. All the Burger Court has done, on this interpretation, is to disabuse-or, in light of Blasi's position, provide us with the opportunity to disabuse-those readers of the illusion that the Warren Court was a place where the party of humanity implemented its political pro-
